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1999, 666-697.A1. The Log-Linear Approximation
The log-linearized model can be summarized as follows. First, wages and the
return on aggregate capital are technologically determined by the capital












where  pRk = (1-v/Rk)×(1-a)>0.
To satisfy the Euler equations (4), the bonds and equity returns must vary
with the capital-labor ratio in the same way as the return on capital.
Their dependence on shocks is different, however, and they generally have
non-zero intercept terms because of risk premiums. Specifically, safe bonds
have a predictable return
(A.1c)
^
Rbt+1 = pRb,0t - pRk×^
kt+1









where  pRe,mt = l×[(1-v/Rk)+pvm×v/Rk]>0.
Second, consider the decision problem of the young. In equilibrium,
bond and equity prices must be such that the young hold the entire net
government debt and all capital except for social security equity holdings.
For given policy rules, the consumption-savings decision of the young can
be interpreted as a decision about how wages minus cash flows to the
government are divided between consumption and aggregate capital
investment. Let
y1t = wt/At×(1-qt) - t1t/At - (dt-ibt×st) + iet×st
be the wage income minus total cash-flows to the government, all defined as
productivity ratios. Then the decision problem of the young is to divide
A-1their exogenous “disposable income” y1t = c1t/At + kt+1 into consumption and
investment.1 The deviations of y1t from the steady state are given by
(A.1e)
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where  py1a = - a + (1-a)×{Rb/an×(d-s)+Rk/an×l×s×ie×(1-v/Rk)}/y1,
py1k = a + [(1-a)×(1-v/Rk)+a]×Rb/an×(d-s)/y1,
py1v = py1R×l×v/Rk, and py1m = py1R×pRe,m,
where an=(1+n)×(1+a), and py1R = st-1×iet-1×Rk/an/y1. Note that py1R>0 iff ie>0.
Thus, py1a is negative for sufficiently small d and s and rising with d-s
and ie; py1v and py1m are positive and proportional to ie.
It is straightforward to show that the young divide their income
between consumption and savings such that the coefficients are proportional
to the y1-coefficients (see Bohn 1998). For all state variables z = k,a,v,m,
the coefficients for ^
kt+1 are
(A.1f) pkz = 
1 + k/(c1/A)
pc2kt + pRk/h + k/(c1/A)
 × py1z
and the coefficients for the consumption-productivity ratio 
^
(c1/A)t are
(A.1g) pc1Az = 
(1+k/(c1/A)) × (pc2k + pRk/h)
pc2k + pRk/h + k/(c1/A)
 × py1,zt.
Relative to the py1z coefficients, the capital coefficients are scaled up or
down depending on whether pc2k + pRk/h is above or below one. If the
elasticity of substitution 1/h is high, the pkz-coefficients are small and
the pc1Az-coefficients are large. Then the capital labor ratio quickly moves
towards its steady state after any disturbance, and individuals are willing
to tolerate the implied variations in consumption.
Third, consider the consumption of the old. Since period-t
productivity is known when generation t makes savings and investment
decisions, it is convenient to focus on the ratio of old-age consumption to
1 I call y1t the young generation’s “disposable income,” although the cash flows to the
government include voluntary debt and equity transactions. Intuitively, one can think of
individuals as doing all capital investment and selling some of their equity claims to
social security.
A-2lagged productivity, c2t+1/At, rather than the ratio to current














where pc2a = (1-a)×{1 - Rk×k×v/an+Rk×l×s×ie×(1-v/Rk)+Rb×(d-s)
(c2/A-) },
pc2v = v/Rk× 
Rk×(k-l×s×ie)
(c2/A-)










and (c2/A-) denotes the steady state of c2t+1/At.
These coefficients confirm the intuition explained above. If l×s×ie<k
(the trust fund holds less than the entire capital stock), v>0, and d-s is
reasonably small, pc2a and pc2v are positive and declining in ie. That is,
the old are exposed to productivity and valuation risk and their exposure
declines if the trust fund hold more equities, as claimed above. Their
exposure to productivity risk also declines with d-s, i.e., when there is
more public debt. Finally, the mt-shocks are irrelevant if ie=0 (pc2m=0);
but for ie>0, pc2m is negative. This negative exposure to relative return
risk is an unavoidable side-effect of trust fund equity investment.
Since the old hold all private wealth, the risk premiums in asset
returns depend on the conditional covariances between returns and old-age
consumption. Assuming log-normality, one obtains










Using (A.1b,d,h), these covariances can be evaluated as functions of the
covariance matrix of shocks weighted by elasticity coefficients.
For the welfare analysis, it is useful to apply a common factor to








the log-deviations of c1t/At-1 from its steady state. When ^
at is added, the
A-3a-coefficient in the law of motion is raised by one while the other
coefficients remain unchanged; i.e., 
^
c1t has coefficients pc1a = pc1Az+1 and
pc1z = pc1Az for z=k,v,m.2 Overall, equations (A.1a-i) characterize the
equilibrium allocation for any sequence of policy parameters (dt,st,iet).
The welfare analysis considers variations in these parameters.
A2. Welfare Analysis
This appendix explains the welfare derivative (14). As explained in Section
4.2, Epstein-Zin (1989) type preferences are usuful in the sensitivity
analysis to calibrate the equity premium without linking risk-aversion to
savings behavior (intertemporal substitution). To accommodate this
generalization, the welfare analysis in this appendix is based on




where r is the rate of time preference, h is the degrees of risk aversion,
and 1/(1-e) is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. These
preferences yield the same allocation as (A.1a-i), except that all pRk/h
terms must be replaced by pRk/(1-e).
In principle, the welfare function (13) could be maximized over a
variety of policy instruments, either chosen period-by-period or fixed for
all times. Here I consider a marginal variation in a single policy
parameter, taking all others as given. This choice setting is most relevant
for the main application, social security equity investments--assuming the
social security administration does not control other policy instruments.3
2 The scaling by lagged productivity avoids an awkward property of productivity ratios:
Generally, a positive productivity shock at has negative effect on ratio variables like
y1t, c1t/At, c2t/At, and kt+1 (see, e.g., py1a in (A.1e)) even though it raises the levels
of income, consumption, and capital. In contrast, pc1a = pc1Aa+1 is positive for
reasonable parameters.
3 An alternative would be to examine the simultaneous choice of all policy parameters, but
that would implicitly assume considerable policy coordination and, with a sufficient set
A-4I further focus a one-time change in the allocation of risk, to highlight
that even one-time changes have long-lasting effects. Multi-period or
permanent changes could always be interpreted as a succession of one-period
changes. Specifically, I assume that at time t=0, the government changes
some policy parameter x so that the period-1 exposure of the old generation
0 and the young generation 1 to shocks is altered. (After period 1, the
allocation of risk remains unchanged.) I consider a generic parameter x to
show that the approach is quite general and could, e.g., be used to examine
a variety of debt and tax policies. The application to social security
equity investments is obtained by setting x=s0×ie0/k.
Since the focus of the paper is on risk-sharing and not
redistribution, I assume that the overall scale of deterministic
intergenerational redistribution matches the social planners welfare
weights. That is, I focus on welfare weights such that the assumed size of
social security (b), the level of government debt (d) and the allocation of
taxes (x2) would be efficient in a deterministic version of the model. Given
the resource constraint
Nt×c1t + Nt-1×c2t + Gt + Kt+1 = Yt + vt×Kt,
deterministic efficiency implies the first order condition
(A.2) w(t)×dUt/dc1t×Nt/Nt-1 = w(t-1)×dUt-1/dc2t.
Since Ut is homogenous of degree 1-h1, balanced growth and the
transversality condition require that w(t) = wt×Nt is exponential and
proportional to population and that w* = w×(1+n)×(1+a)1-h satisfies
w*Î(0,1). (Arbitrary welfare weights could be accommodated without changing
essential results, if one took the perfect foresight path of the
of instruments, end up yielding the first-best allocation, which is more conveniently
obtained directly; see Bohn (1998).
A-5deterministic economy as baseline for the log-linearization. But that would
complicate the exposition without providing new insights.)
A subtle point concerns government spending. Spending in proportion
to GDP is reasonable for modeling the time series of government spending,
but endogenous spending would distort the planner’s problem just like a tax
on output. Hence, I assume that spending is proportional to the GDP of the
original allocation, but exogenous at that level and not varying with
alternative policies.
In general, the welfare effect of a period-0 change in a policy
































subject to the macroeconomic dynamics approximately characterized by (A.1a-
h). The period-1 policy change has direct effects on the state-contingent
consumption at time t=1, i.e., on c11 and c21 only. But additional
“indirect” effects arise changes in the period-1 income of the young affect
the state-contingent path of capital accumulation; generally dcit/dx =
dcit/dkt×dkt/dx is non-zero for all t³2.
In the context of a first-best welfare maximization problem, the
indirect effects could be ignored with reference to the envelope theorem.
Future policy choices would be such that the benefits of capital
accumulation are allocated efficiently across future generations. But if
future policy is taken as given, changes in future capital stocks induced
by a t=1 reallocation of risk will have a non-trivial impact on future
generations.




































= u1t - (1+n)×u2t+1,

















The first equality holds because generation t optimizes over kt+1 and
dc1t/dkt=At×(dy1t/dkt-dkt+1/dkt); the second follows from the resource and
technology constraints.4 Thus, the indirect welfare effects depend on how
changes in capital affect future generations’ disposable income y1. If
(A.4) is used in (A.3) and the sum is re-arranged by periods (rather than
























The terms w×u1t-u2t would be identically zero in a first-best allocation,
because a first-best allocation would require (A.2) to hold in every state
of nature (see Bohn 1998), which implies w×u1t=u2t. But for given policy
rules, (A.2) is non-zero along most sample paths--even though I assume that
(A.2) is zero in expectation to remove pure redistributional issues. Given
4 Let CFt+1 be the cash-flows from the government to the old (all non-capital income), so


























 - Rkt+1× At×
dkt+1
dkt









Since cash-flows to the old must come from the young (by the government budget identity,







 = (1+n)× At+1×
dy1t+1
dkt+1
which explains the format of u2t+1 and its negative sign.
A-7(A.2) is zero in expectation, the expressions in (A.3’) can be interpreted
as covariances between marginal utilities and policy-induced changes in
income. Intuitively, a policy change “improves” the allocation of risk, if
it gives additional income to a cohort in those states of nature in which
its marginal utility is above the (w-weighted) marginal utility of the
other cohort.5
Similar arguments apply for the period-1 tradeoff between c11 and c21,
the first two terms in (A.3’). Since generation 1 optimizes over k2, the
relevant tradeoff is between c21 and y11. A policy change improves the
allocation of risk in period 1, if it gives additional income to the old
(raises c21 and lowers y11) in states of nature in which dU0/dc21 is above
w×dU1/dc11.
To obtain (14), consider the case of x=ie0    ×s 0/k (so that x can be
interpreted as the fraction of the capital stock held by social security),
use the macroeconomic dynamics of (A.1a-h), and take log-linear and log-





























1-w*×pkk2 are constants; COVs






)s is a gradient
vector with elements dpx,s/dx (s=a,v,m); (pk,s)s is a vector with elements
pk,s. Finally, the DW-terms are
(A.6) DWs = (pc2s - pc1s) + (1-j)×(h+e-1)/h×pRk×pks
where j = (c1/A)e/[(c1/A)e+r×(c2/A)e×(1+a)e] Î (0,1) and
5 Here one can see that setting (A.4) to zero in expectation is conceptually useful to
distinguish risk-sharing and redistributional issues. If (A.4) were violated in
expectation, certain policy changes may be desirable or undesirable merely because of
their deterministic distributional effects, which would confound their risk-sharing
effects.
A-8(A.7) DWk = (pc2k - pc1k) + (h+e-1)/h×pRk×[(1-j)×pkk1+j].
In essence, dW0/dx is a weighted average of the DW-terms. For each of
the shocks (s=a,v,m), DWs measures the discrepancy between dU0/dc21 and
w×dU1/dc11 in states of nature in which the respective shock is non-zero.
For example, consider a productivity shock s=a. For CRRA utility, the DW-
terms reduce to DWs = pc2s-pc1s, so that (A.5) reduces to (14).
A3. Derivation of the Earnings-Income Ratio
Let earnings Eft be the capital income of the firms in the social security
equity portfolio (a×Yft) minus accounting depreciation (a constant DEP)
minus interest expenses,
Eft = a×Yft - DEP×Kft - (Rbt-1)×(l-1)/l×Kft
where Kft are the firm’s assets, which are l times the firm equity. The
firm’s capital income is the income component of (10). It equals the firm’s
capital stock times the aggregate capital income/capital stock ratio times
the relative shock, Yft = Yt/Kt×Kft×mt. Using a log-linear approximation
around the steady state (around a×Yf/Kf = Rk-1+DEP), one can write the ratio





















where lE = Rk-1+DEP
Rk-1
×l >0 is the steady state ratio of firm earnings to
capital income. In terms of innovations, unexpected changes in the
earnings-income ratio are a linear combination of productivity shocks and








as claimed in the text (using Yt-Et-1[Yt] = (1-a)×^
at). Note that the ratio of
firm size Kft to the aggregate capital stock Kt is unrestricted in this
A-9derivation. In the data, the ratio of S&P500 earnings to aggregate capital
income displays a negative time trend. In the context of (A.8), this trend
can be interpreted as a trend in the relative capital stocks, and hence, as
consistent with the theoretical model.
A-10